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THE DIVISION OF MATRIMONIAL ASSETS: A MATHEMATICAL 
METHODOLOGY AS A “CHECK”? 
 
AJR v. AJS1 
 
CHEN SIYUAN* 
 
In a recent High Court decision concerning the division of matrimonial assets, the Judge 
developed an extensive (and somewhat mathematical) methodology “as a rough check” to his 
discretionary powers in determining a “just and equitable” division of the matrimonial assets. This 
introduced a new perspective to an exercise long considered to be impossible to be mathematically 
precise. This piece considers the extent of the utility of the new methodology. 
 
I. ESTABLISHING THE CONTEXT 
 
Section 112(1) of the Women’s Charter2 is the principal statutory provision that governs the 
division of matrimonial assets in Singapore: 
 
The court shall have power, when granting or subsequent to the grant of a judgment of 
divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage, to order the division between the 
parties of any matrimonial asset or the sale of any such asset and the division between the 
parties of the proceeds of the sale of any such asset in such proportions as the court 
thinks just and equitable.  
 
Section 112(2) further provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court shall take into 
consideration, such as the extent of the contributions made by each party towards the 
matrimonial assets, the needs of the children of the marriage, and the extent of the contributions 
made by each party to the welfare of the family.  
The division of matrimonial assets has long been considered by our courts as likely to be 
an imprecise mathematical exercise.3 One of the reasons is that the court, as empowered by 
s. 112, is given a fairly broad discretion to make a division that is “just and equitable”. The 
factors that the court may take into consideration are also non-exhaustive. Another reason is that 
contributions made by the spouses may not always be measurable in financial terms. Indeed, it 
has been suggested that s. 112 ought to be guided by three defining principles: (i) any asset 
acquired during marriage is liable to division; (ii) the power is to be exercised in broad strokes 
rather than a misguided attempt at mathematical precision; and (iii) the aim of the court is to 
reach a fair and reasonable division of the assets between the spouses.4 
                                                            
* Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. I will like to thank my family and wife-to-be for 
their unceasing support and encouragement. I will also like to thank my wife-to-be for her comments on the 
draft, and also the comments of the anonymous referee. All errors, however, remain mine. 
1  [2010] SGHC 199 [AJR v. AJS]. 
2  Cap. 353, 2009 Rev. Ed. Sing. [Women’s Charter]. 
3  See e.g., Koo Shirley v. Mok Kong Chua Kenneth [1989] 1 Sing. L.R. (R.) 244 (H.C.) at paras. 16 and 25 
[Koo Shirley]; Yeong Swan Ann v. Lim Fei Yen [1999] 1 Sing. L.R. (R.) 49 (C.A.) at para. 23; NK v. NL [2007] 3 
Sing. L.R. (R.) 743 (C.A.) at paras. 28 and 36 [NK v. NL];  AJR v. AJS, supra note 1 at para. 19. 
4  Leong Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore (Singapore: LexisNexis, 2007) at 540-541 [Elements of 
Family Law in Singapore]. Professor Leong had gleaned these three principles from Koo Shirley, supra note 3. 
Although the case was decided under the predecessor to s. 112 of the Women’s Charter (the then s. 106, a 
However, in the recent High Court case of AJR v. AJS, the Judge, while mindful of the 
mathematical imprecision of the exercise, proposed an eight-step methodology “which takes into 
account the parties’ direct attributable and unattributable financial contributions to the marriage 
as well as their indirect contributions to the marriage.”5 The Judge stressed that the proposed 
methodology was only for “comparison purposes and as a rough check whether I could have 
made a serious error in the exercise of my discretion” and that “the methodology is no more than 
a useful guide and is not a substitute for the [existing] judicial approach”.6 Nevertheless, the 
Judge in AJR v. AJS has given us a new (albeit supplementary) perspective to the issue and his 
judgment should be further examined.  
Before we delve deeper into the proposed methodology, it seems appropriate to quickly 
recapitulate the existing judicial approach. This is imperative because first, the Judge in AJR v. 
AJS had referred to this several times, and second, the existing approach forms an indispensable 
basis for comparison (and analysis for compatibility) with the proposed methodology.  
 
II. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR THE DIVISION OF MATRIMONIAL ASSETS 
 
The current leading (and perhaps most comprehensive) decision on the division of matrimonial 
assets is probably the 2007 Court of Appeal decision in NK v. NL,7 which was also referred to in 
AJR v. AJS. 
 The facts are not particularly important for present purposes, so suffice to say that the 
appellant wife and respondent husband were married from 1982 to 2005, and there were four 
main contentions regarding the division of matrimonial assets: (i) the trial judge failed to factor 
in the profits from the sale proceeds of previous properties when dividing the interest in the 
matrimonial home; (ii) the trial judge failed to include the husband’s company and related 
companies in the pool of matrimonial assets to be divided; (iii) the trial judge erred in the 
quantification of the cash assets available for distribution; and (iv) the trial judge had ordered a 
charge for the sum of $50,000 on the husband’s CPF accounts.  
 The Court of Appeal first made some important prefatory remarks about s. 112 of the 
Women’s Charter: 
 
To begin with, the [Women’s Charter], enacted in 1961, was (as the terminology 
suggests) designed to protect the rights and interests of women in Singapore. Over the 
years, the [Women’s Charter] has evolved to protect various social interests, such as the 
welfare of children and the institution of marriage, and to regulate the legal effects of a 
dissolution of marriage. Recent amendments further extend protection to the family, 
define the equal status and obligations of the husband and wife, and give the court greater 
powers to deal with incidents of family violence. 
 
The objective of the current provision for the division of matrimonial assets appears to be 
to strengthen its predecessor provision, to widen the court’s powers and to give it the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
provision which was differently framed), Professor Leong further stated that the “power bestowed by section 112 
of the Women’s Charter is best exercised by keeping these three defining principles in mind”. 
5  Supra note 1 at para. 23 (emphasis in original). 
6  Ibid. 
7  Supra note 3. 
flexibility to effect a more just and equitable division after taking into consideration all 
the circumstances of the case…8 
 
The Court of Appeal then laid down the basic principles of the application of s. 112, emphasising 
the equitable nature of a division of matrimonial assets: 
 
Section 112(2) of the [Women’s Charter] enumerates a list of factors to be considered to 
assist the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under s. 112(1), and, if so, in 
what manner. These considerations are not exhaustive and are subject to the overriding 
impetus of what is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case. The division of 
matrimonial assets under the [Women’s Charter] is founded on the prevailing ideology of 
marriage as an equal co-operative partnership of efforts. The contributions of both 
spouses are equally recognised whether he or she concentrates on the economics or 
homemaking role, as both roles must be performed equally well if the marriage is to 
flourish. When the marriage breaks up, these contributions are translated into economic 
assets in the distribution according to s. 112(2) of the [Women’s Charter]. However, by 
this time… “the spouses’ financial affairs [will] have become so inextricably tangled that 
an equitable knife must be used to sever the ‘Gordian knot’”9. 10 
 
Next, the Court of Appeal laid down a methodology for division, beginning with the role of 
direct contributions, but being careful to point out that indirect non-financial contributions 
should be treated on a similar footing and that all the circumstances of the case had to be 
examined: 
 
The traditional approach is to consider direct contributions as a prima facie starting point 
before making adjustments to reflect the non-financial contribution of the parties... This 
prevalent approach of the courts held sway under the former s. 106 of the [Women's 
Charter]11 where the underlying spirit of s. 106(2) was to lean towards equality subject to 
the considerations mentioned therein… 
  
The traditional approach was considered in the Singapore High Court decision of Soh 
Chan Soon v. Tan Choon Yock12  [which] interpreted direct financial contributions as 
only one factor amidst the multifarious factors for consideration… 
 
These observations were cited with approval in… Yow Mee Lan v. Chen Kai Buan13  by 
Judith Prakash J, who emphasised… that a party’s financial contributions to the 
acquisition of any particular matrimonial asset could not be primarily determinative of 
how it was divided, and that the court was free to give as much weight or more to other 
non-financial factors… 
                                                            
8  Ibid. at paras. 15-16. 
9  The Court of Appeal cited Lord Upjohn’s judgment in National Provincial Bank Ltd v. Ainsworth [1965] A.C. 
1175 (H.L.) at 1236. 
10  Supra note 3 at para. 20 (emphasis in original). 
11  Cap. 353, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing. On the difference between the s. 106 of the then Women’s Charter and s. 112 of 
the current Women’s Charter, see supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
12  [1998] SGHC 204 at paras. 6-7 and 9 (Warren L H Khoo J.). 
13  [2000] 2 Sing. L.R. (R.) 659 (H.C.) at para. 32. 
 
Prakash J's approach was unequivocally endorsed by this court in Lim Choon Lai v. Chew 
Kim Heng14 … 
 
These clarifications unequivocally reiterate the duty of the court to remain cognisant of 
the limitations of using the parties’ direct financial contributions as a starting point. This 
is eminently sensible as direct financial contributions alone are far from determinative of 
the actual contributions to the economic partnership as a whole. Three points of guidance 
can be added. First, the abolition of the s. 106 distinction between joint and sole 
acquisition of assets paves the way for the court to put financial and non-financial 
contributions on an equal footing… 
 
Secondly, it is essential that courts resist the temptation to lapse into a minute scrutiny of 
the conduct and efforts of both spouses, which may be objectionable in disadvantaging 
the spouse whose efforts are difficult to evaluate in financial terms. Section 112 of the 
[Women’s Charter] was enacted in response to the concept of marriage as an equal 
partnership of efforts, such that it would be counterproductive to try and particularise 
each party’s respective contribution to wealth creation (although this does not, as we have 
recently emphasised in Lock Yeng Fun v. Chua Hock Chye15 … signify equality as a 
starting point or norm in the division of matrimonial assets). In the absence of 
documentary evidence, courts must indeed make a “rough and ready approximation” 16 … 
and avoid falling back on the view that favours financial contribution to the acquisition of 
property. 
 
Finally, it is paramount that courts do not focus merely on a direct and indirect 
contributions dichotomy in arriving at a just and equitable division of matrimonial assets. 
The various factors enumerated by s. 112(2) of the [Women’s Charter], which are no less 
important, must be duly assessed and considered as a whole. At the end of the day, no 
one factor should be determinative as the court's mandate is to come to a just and 
equitable division of the matrimonial assets having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case. 17 
 
The Court of Appeal then delved deeper into the role of indirect contributions, and upon a survey 
of the case law, identified two distinct methodologies, which the Judge in AJR v. AJS would later 
allude to: 
 
The first methodology consists of four distinct phases: viz., identification, assessment, 
division and apportionment (“the global assessment methodology”). According to this 
approach, the court’s duty is to (a) identify and pool all the matrimonial assets pursuant to 
s. 112(10) of the [Women’s Charter]; (b) assess the net value of the pool of assets; (c) 
determine a just and equitable division in the light of all the circumstances of the case; 
and (d) decide on the most convenient way to achieve these proportions of division, [i.e.], 
                                                            
14  [2001] 2 Sing. L.R. (R.) 260 (C.A.). 
15  [2007] 3 Sing. L.R. (R.) 520 (C.A.) [Lock Yeng Fun]. 
16  See Hoong Khai Soon v. Cheng Kwee Eng [1993] 1 Sing. L.R. (R.) 823 at para.17. 
17  Supra note 1 at paras. 23-29 (emphasis in original). 
how the order of division should be satisfied from the assets… Pursuant to this approach, 
the percentage for indirect contributions is applied without distinction to all matrimonial 
assets… 
 
The second methodology, on the other hand, involves an assimilation of all four of the 
above steps into a broad judicial discretion which, in the first instance, separately 
considers and divides classes of matrimonial assets (“the classification methodology”). 
Pursuant to this method, the court apportions classes of matrimonial assets separately, for 
example, the matrimonial home, cash in bank accounts, shares, and businesses, etc. Any 
direct financial contributions and indirect contributions are considered in relation 
to each class of assets, rather than by way of a global assessment…18 
 
However, the Court of Appeal declined to endorse one methodology over the other. In its view, 
both were consistent with the legislative framework provided by s. 112, which placed primary 
importance of the facts and circumstances of the case. The court should therefore adopt the 
methodology which would lead to division in a just and equitable manner.  
The Court of Appeal concluded its discourse with four subsidiary points: 
 
(1) “Where one spouse… has devoted his or her entire time to the family over a 
lengthy period of time”, one has to “ensure that indirect contributions are not 
undervalued”;19 
(2) “[P]ursuant to ‘the classification methodology’, only the direct contributions may 
vary. The element of indirect contributions in the context of homemaking and 
child caring must necessarily remain constant in relation to each class of asset… 
[T]his [classification] approach would be appropriate where there are multiple 
classes of assets, and where the parties have made different contributions”;20 
(3) “Where each spouse has discharged his or her homemaking role equally… this 
must be taken into account in achieving a just apportionment”;21 and 
(4) “The exclusion of particular matrimonial assets from the overall computation in 
favour of dividing certain assets may possibly be rationalised as convenient and 
less obtrusive, but may create an impression of arbitrariness and ostensibly 
prejudice the fair and equitable division”.22 
 
III. A NEW PERSPECTIVE? 
 
A. Facts of AJR v. AJS and Preliminary Issues 
 
Having set out the existing legislative and judicial approaches to the division of matrimonial 
assets, we turn to the new (but supplementary) perspective introduced in AJR v. AJS23. 
 The parties were married in Guam in 1995. The marriage produced three children. Both 
parties had started life in the financial industry and were earning about the same amount initially 
                                                            
18  Ibid. at paras. 31-33 (emphasis in original). 
19  Ibid. at para. 34 (emphasis in original). 
20  Ibid. at para. 35. 
21  Ibid. at para. 37. 
22  Ibid. at para. 39. 
23  Supra note 1. 
until the husband subsequently stayed home and became a househusband from 2001 to 2006. 
However, even after the husband stopped working, it was largely the wife who looked after their 
various investments and most of the household matters (including looking after the children). 
The wife filed for divorce in 2006 and interim judgment was granted in 2007. 24 One of the two 
issues (and the one that concerns us) before the Judge was the manner in which the matrimonial 
assets were to be distributed. 
 But there were three preliminary issues (vis-à-vis matrimonial assets) that the Judge 
decided to address first. Between the date of the interim judgment and the hearing before the 
Judge, there was “a change both in the value and in the nature of the assets through the 
acquisition of new assets”.25 Specifically, they were that: (i) the value of the assets had increased 
due to the accumulation of both parties’ salaries earned after the interim judgment; (ii) the wife 
had purchased three properties in Malaysia for investment purposes; (iii) the wife had bought a 
piece of land in Singapore to build a house; (iv) the wife had exercised some stock options which 
she had acquired before the interim judgment; and (v) some of the proceeds from the sale of a 
property in South Africa (which had been acquired in the wife’s name before the interim 
judgment) were only transferred to her account in 2008.26 
  The Judge, after consulting the local cases,27 concluded that: 
 
[A]part from assets acquired before the marriage which satisfy the definition of 
“matrimonial assets” in s 112(10)(a) of the Women’s Charter… the matrimonial assets 
available for distribution should be restricted to the assets acquired in the course of the 
marriage by both parties up to [the interim judgment]… The rationale behind this is that 
the interim judgment puts an end to the marriage contract and indicates that the parties no 
longer intend to participate in the joint accumulation of matrimonial assets nor in any 
further joint investment in any matrimonial assets with the associated market risk of a fall 
in the value of those joint investments, unless there is evidence to substantiate a mutual 
intention to the contrary.28 
 
The second preliminary issue was whether an “innocent party to the marriage” should be “made 
to suffer” if the other party “indulged in certain vices involving a large amount of expenditure… 
to the extent that matrimonial assets [were] unfairly or unjustly depleted”.29 
 The Judge opined that: 
 
[T]he court has a discretion to decide whether or not such a wasteful dissipation of 
matrimonial assets should be accounted for at all, and if so, the extent to which that 
wasteful dissipation should be accounted for in order to make the eventual distribution of 
matrimonial assets just and equitable for the innocent party.30 
 
                                                            
24  Ibid. at paras. 1 and 16. 
25  Ibid. at para. 3. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Sivakolunthu Kumarasamy v. Shanmugam Nagaiah [1987] Sing. L.R. (R.) 702 (C.A.) at para. 25; 
Yap Hwee May Kathryn v. Geh Thien En Martin [2007] 3 Sing. L.R. (R.) 663 (H.C.) at para. 26. 
28  Supra note 1 at para. 4. See also ibid. at para. 5. 
29  Ibid. at para. 6. 
30  Ibid. 
The Judge sought to elaborate on this in his proposed methodology31. 
 The third preliminary issue concerned the situation: 
 
[W]here one party, prior to the date of interim judgment, uses money from the pool of 
matrimonial assets to acquire assets in his or her own name in circumstances in which 
both parties are aware that the party acquiring such assets is making the investment for 
his or her own purposes and has no intention that the other party partake in such 
investment, and where the other party could not reasonably have expected to share in the 
investment in the event of a divorce.32 
 
The Judge opined that “the court also has a discretion to decide how to account for such 
expenditure”, 33 and also sought to elaborate on this in his proposed methodology.34 
 
B. The Result Based on the Broad Discretion 
 
The Judge then listed the assets which existed on the date of the interim judgment, as follows: (i) 
an Australian property; (ii) Perth Mint (gold); (iii) Perth Mint (silver); (iv) proceeds from the sale 
of the South African property; (v) the wife’s stock options; (vi) monies in the wife’s bank 
accounts; (vii) monies in the wife’s CPF accounts; (viii) monies in the husband’s bank accounts; 
and (ix) monies in the husband’s CPF accounts.35 
The Judge, on the basis of his broad powers vested in him by s. 112, and in consideration 
of the principles established in NK v. NL (which have been set out in the previous section of this 
piece), first held that “the proportion of the total net value of matrimonial assets available for 
distribution which it would be just and equitable to award to the husband, is in my view broadly 
20%”.36 The wife was to receive the remaining 80%. 
This result was predicated on the fact that: (i) “equality of division of matrimonial assets 
was not the norm and that in the large majority of cases decided by the courts, equality of 
division was not achievable on the facts”;37 (ii) this was “not a case where one marriage partner 
took care of all the responsibilities of looking after the children and household while the other 
focused on her career”;38 (iii) under the “classification methodology”, it was difficult to account 
for unattributable “direct financial contributions to the family welfare (such as food, school 
expenses, medical expenses, utilities, and holiday expenses)”; 39  (iv) “in most marriage 
partnerships it is largely fortuitous as to which party contributes directly towards the acquisition 
of matrimonial assets”;40 and (v) the ratio of the total incomes (of both parties) during the life of 
                                                            
31  See Part C, below. 
32  Supra note 1 at para. 7. 
33  Ibid. 
34  See Part C, below. 
35  Ibid. at para. 8. 
36  Ibid. at para. 16. See also ibid. at paras. 18-20 and 23. 
37  Ibid. at para. 15. The Judge cited Lau Loon Seng v. Sia Peck Eng [1999] 2 Sing. L.R. (R.) 688 (H.C.) and Lock 
Yeng Fun, supra note 15. 
38  Ibid. at para. 16. 
39  Ibid. at para. 21. 
40  Ibid. at para. 22. 
the marriage would prima facie determine the parties’ respective direct financial contributions 
(both attributable and unattributable) for the purpose of division.41  
 
C. The Proposed Methodology: A Check on Discretion? 
 
We proceed then to the precise steps in the Judge’s proposed methodology that was supposed to 
act as a check to his discretion (and as a “useful guide”).42 Essentially, he considered that parties 
to a marriage “may make direct financial contributions to the marriage in different ways, some of 
which are totally unrelated to the acquisition or maintenance of any identifiable matrimonial 
assets, e.g., food, education etc… whilst others are traceable to matrimonial assets”, and the 
methodology “takes into account the parties’ direct attributable and unattributable financial 
contributions to the marriage, as well as their indirect contributions to the marriage.”43 The 
methodology comprised eight steps, which can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Total net value of matrimonial assets to be distributed 
 
The notional total net value of matrimonial assets to be distributed is denoted as $A. This 
consists of the total net value of the matrimonial assets to be distributed ($m), plus: (i) the value 
of any matrimonial asset proved to have been unfairly dissipated ($n); (ii) and the value of any 
matrimonial asset expended by either party for a personal investment in which the other party 
cannot reasonably have expected to participate in ($p). The assets considered will be those that 
existed on the date of interim judgment, less any outstanding liabilities which were incurred 
before the interim judgment. If any asset was sold or liquidated after the interim judgment, the 
net proceeds will be used to represent the value of that asset in the calculation of $m.44 Thus, $A 
may be represented in the following equation: 
 
 
 
2. The percentage of direct contributions of both parties and indirect contributions of both 
parties 
 
The total contributions of both parties to the marriage will be apportioned into the percentage 
total direct contributions of both parties (B%) and the percentage total indirect contributions of 
both parties (C%). B% and C% add up to 100%. The ratio of B% to C% depends on factors such 
as: (i) length of marriage; (ii) number of children; (iii) existence of a third party carer; (iv) extent 
of assisting the other party (such as in the occupation or business); and (v) total amount of time 
and effort that both parties had spent looking after the welfare of the family may affect the 
relative weightage or importance of the total direct contribution as against the 
                                                            
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid. at para. 23. 
43  Supreme Court, “Supreme Court Note: AJR v AJS [2010] SGHC 199 (division of matrimonial assets)” Supreme 
Court Note (July 2010), online: Singapore Law Watch 
<http://www.singaporelawwatch.sg/remweb/legal/ln2/rss/commentaries/68335.html?utm_source=rss%20subscri
ption&utm_medium=rss> (emphasis in original). See also ibid. at paras. 21 and 23. 
44  AJR v. AJS, supra note 1 at paras. 26-27. 
total indirect contribution of both parties. 45  The relationship between B% and C% may be 
represented in the equation: 
 
 
 
3. The direct contributions of each party 
 
The husband’s total direct contribution to the marriage is denoted as D% and the wife’s 
total direct contribution to the marriage is denoted by E%. D% and E% add up to 100%. In 
determining direct contribution, unless disputed, it will be assumed that the parties have applied 
all matrimonial assets (as defined in s. 112(10)) that they have received in the course of the 
marriage to the welfare of the family. This includes earned salary, monetary emoluments, income 
from business (including stock options), and the amount accumulated in the CPF accounts. D% 
and E% will be multiplied by B% separately to obtain DB% and EB%. 46  The relationship 
between D%, E% and B is as follows: 
 
 
 
4. The indirect contributions of each party 
 
The husband’s share of the total indirect contribution to the marriage (F%) and the wife’s share 
of the total indirect contribution to the marriage (G%) will be determined on the facts of the 
case. F% and G% together should be 100%, representing the total indirect contribution of both 
parties towards the marriage partnership. F% and G% will be multiplied by C% respectively to 
obtain FC% and GC% as the percentage of matrimonial assets which is to be awarded to the 
husband and wife respectively, arising from his/her indirect contribution to the family.47 The 
relationship between F%, G% and C is as follows: 
 
 
 
5. The value of matrimonial assets to be distributed to the husband 
 
The notional total value of matrimonial assets to be distributed to the husband (X) is arrived at by 
adding DB% and FC%, which is then multiplied by the notional total value of all the 
matrimonial assets available for distribution ($A):48 
 
 
 
6. The value of matrimonial assets to be distributed to the wife 
 
                                                            
45  Ibid. at paras. 28-30. 
46  Ibid. at paras. 31-33. 
47  Ibid. at para. 34. 
48  Ibid. at para. 35. 
The notional total value of matrimonial assets to be distributed to the wife (Y) is arrived at by 
adding EB% and GC%, which is then multiplied by the notional total value of all the 
matrimonial assets available for distribution ($A):49 
 
 
 
7. The deduction of the value of assets dissipated or expended exclusively for one party’s 
purposes from the amount of matrimonial assets to be distributed to that party responsible for 
that dissipation or exclusive expenditure 
 
The total value of assets that have been unjustly dissipated from the pool of matrimonial assets, 
or expended for the acquisition of personal investments in circumstances in which neither parties 
intended the other party to participate in such investments will be deducted from 
the notional total value of matrimonial assets to be distributed to that party. Assuming the 
husband has removed $H in assets from the pool, the actual value of matrimonial assets which 
will be distributed to him will be [$A x (DB% + FC%) - $H]. If the wife has removed $J in assets 
from the pool, the actual value of matrimonial assets which will be distributed to her will be 
[$A x (EB% + GC%) - $J].50 
 
8. The final value of matrimonial assets to be distributed to each party 
 
The final ratio of the value of the matrimonial assets to be received by the husband and the value 
of matrimonial assets to be received by the wife can thus be reflected as 
[$A x (DB% + FC%) - $H]: [$A x (EB% + GC%) - $J]. This ratio may be applied to the total 
pool of matrimonial assets actually valued at the total net amount of $m or to the net value of 
each and every matrimonial asset if the matrimonial assets are to be distributed individually.51 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PARADIGM AND CONCLUSION 
 
The Judge seems to have meticulously developed an orderly and mathematical (and almost 
formulaic) framework that – it bears repeating – is designed only to assist in the exercise of the 
division of matrimonial assets. This new framework appears original and looks impressive 
without being too convoluted, yet therein lies the potential tension between this new paradigm of 
seeming precision, and the existing statutory and judicial framework that is unequivocally averse 
to mathematical precision. It does seem a matter of degree, however. Obviously a judge cannot 
be apportioning matrimonial assets on a whim, hazarding arbitrary guesses for undisclosed 
assets, or conjuring up numbers, ratios, and equations out of nowhere. On the other extreme, a 
judge cannot (and should not, based on the cases) be parsing through every single detail and 
aiming for scientific or mathematical absolution. In other words, it is not a binary question of 
“shall we be totally precise” or “shall we be totally imprecise”. The current and prevailing 
sentiment appears more to be “it is almost impossible to be precise in such an exercise (of the 
division of matrimonial assets), but let us try to be as fair as possible”. If we equate fairness with 
greater – and not perfect – precision, then this new methodology passes muster on that count 
                                                            
49  Ibid. at para. 36. 
50  Ibid. at para. 37. 
51  Ibid. at para. 38. 
(and should not be feared given its simplicity and actual reach). That is, the paradigm is merely 
being faithful to “it is almost impossible to be precise in such an exercise, but let us try to be as 
fair and precise as possible.” It may be said that this is consistent with the courts’ recognition of 
an increasing array of factors to the (albeit discretionary) calculations over the years,52 yet it 
may also be said that the more one tries to pre-empt a framework and pre-set the boundaries, the 
more unnecessary impediments are presented to the court’s exercise of what is essentially (and 
legislatively intended to be) a broad and dynamic discretion.  
A possible response to the latter point in the preceding statement is that the new 
methodology did not (and did not purport to) inject anything overly ambitious or unworkable vis-
à-vis the existing framework.53 It is submitted that the complexities lie not in the application of 
the new methodology, but continue to lie in the derivation of the numbers that fill the parameters 
of the new methodology, to which perhaps no concrete solution can be offered.54 At any rate, a 
restatement of the eight-step methodology in simpler and non-abstract terms may be helpful: 
 
(1) Let us suppose that the assets in question are a house worth $450,000, and two joint 
accounts containing $100,000. $m is thus $550,000. Let us further suppose that the 
husband had unfairly dissipated $50,000. $A is thus $600,000. 
(2) Let us suppose that the direct contributions (B) make up 60% and the indirect 
contributions (C) make up 40%. 
(3) Let us suppose that the husband’s share of the total direct contributions (D) is 40% and 
the wife’s share of the total direct contributions (E) is 60%. Accordingly, DB% is 24% 
and EB is 36%. 
(4) Let us suppose that the husband’s share of the total indirect contributions (F) is 70% and 
the wife’s share of the total indirect contributions (G) is 30%. Accordingly, FC% is 28% 
and GC% is 12%. 
(5) The husband’s share of $A is thus 52%. 
(6) The wife’s share of $A is thus 48%. 
(7) Given the $50,000 unfairly dissipated by the husband, the actual value of his assets is 
$262,000. The actual value of the wife’s assets is $288,000. 
(8) The final husband-wife percentage-ratio is thus 47.6:52.4.  
 
So on this view, it appears that this new methodology is in the right spirit and, once 
distilled, of the right complexity (and arguably of compatibility with the existing methodology), 
although without adding much in terms of how one arrives at the crucial fields of “B%”, “C%”, 
“F%” and “G%”. In particular, attributing percentages to the total direct contributions (B%) and 
total indirect contributions (C%) requires valuing monetary earnings against non-monetary 
efforts – an exercise impossible to execute with any mathematical precision. 
In AJR v. AJS, the Judge chose 65% and 35% respectively to signify the total direct 
contributions and total indirect contributions of both parties, taking into account that the 
engagement of the services of two domestic helpers by the parties resulted in the reduction of the 
total indirect contributions “in terms of sparing the parties the time and effort expended in 
                                                            
52  For instance, the role of indirect contributions, unattributable contributions, expenditures after the first decree, 
and so forth. 
53  But then see the “sensitivity analysis” that emerged after the application of the proposed methodology: 
AJR v. AJS, supra note 1 at paras. 57-58. 
54  Ibid. at paras. 41-55. 
cooking, washing and cleaning the home which would otherwise comprise part of the indirect 
contribution to be taken into account of the party attending to such household chores for the 
welfare of the family”. 55  From this, it could be inferred that had the parties been solely 
responsible for the management of their household, B:C ought to be nearer to or perhaps at a 
ratio of 1:1. This ought to be correct in light of the fact that monetary and non-monetary 
contributions are supposed to be placed on an “equal footing”.56 Nevertheless, it is rather obvious 
that despite its formulaic appearance, a substantial amount of non-mathematical discretion is 
involved in the exercise, and this means that it may be more fruitful to just abandon any sort of 
mathematical rigidity altogether and focus on whether there is anything to suggest that the 
partnership has not been an equal one.57  
Additionally, there is still the issue of what happens when the figures (or to be precise, 
final ratios) arrived at using this methodology, for whatever reason, differs significantly from a 
“rougher” calculation based on the existing statutory and judicial framework? The Judge had 
said that this methodology is not intended to supersede existing methodologies, and is only 
meant as a “check” on discretion or as a “useful guide”, so what happens when the figures 
(ratios) do not square very well? The characterisation of the methodology as either a check or 
having an guiding function is thus problematic in such a situation – is there much utility for a 
supplementary methodology that can only be invoked to confirm and not to rebut? On this point, 
it is also difficult not to raise questions when the judge’s proposed methodology produced 
exactly the same result as that derived from a rough and broad application of his discretionary 
powers. Was the application of this methodology in this case thus an instance of ex post facto 
reasoning?  
In any event, if indeed we accept the premise that the new methodology is not really 
different from the existing methodology, then there is technically nothing stopping us from 
embracing it as something more than its current tentative (and therefore unhelpful) 
characterisation, although it has to be seriously questioned as to why there has been hitherto no 
mathematical framework ever advocated (in fact, quite the contrary). On the other hand, any 
formulaic framework will always be approached with some apprehension, simply because of the 
possible trammelling of the judge’s discretion. Perhaps the next Court of Appeal decision that 
deals with the division of matrimonial assets can provide some comments on the role of this new 
methodology.58 Even so, that is merely the general point, concerning the technical soundness of 
this supplementary paradigm. This case also raises some specific and wider social concerns 
which need to be addressed. 
The relationship in this case was never refuted as an equal co-operative partnership, albeit 
of different efforts. This was a 12-year union between a very financially successful wife and a 
less financially successful husband, who had the misfortune of suffering a medical condition 
since 2001 when he stopped working. In fact, his Attention Deficit Disorder was only diagnosed 
towards the end of the marriage in 2006, but this must have made it hard for him to consider 
continuing to work. This was also a relationship without any serious allegation of misconduct 
(on the part of either party) or anything extremely out of the ordinary regarding their relationship 
as spouses. Is it then the fairest division of the spoils when the court declares that the wife should 
                                                            
55  Ibid. at para. 42. 
56  NK v. NL, supra note 3 at para. 27. 
57  But it should be noted that the Court of Appeal had categorically rejected equality as a presumed starting point in 
the division of assets: see e.g., Lock Yeng Fun, supra note 15 at para. 55. 
58  At this point in writing, it is believed that an appeal has been lodged for AJR v. AJS, supra note 1. 
receive four times more than the husband? One has to trawl back in time to find cases with such 
a disparity – and those cases usually involved some extreme facts or behaviours not necessarily 
related to financial capabilities.59 So what does this proportion of division in this case convey, 
implicitly or explicitly, to all the married people (or people about to marry, for the matter) in 
Singapore of the nature of their commitment in marriage? After a series of cases in which the 
courts have clearly recognised the importance of non-financial contributions (and the 
impossibility of quantifying and weighing them precisely with any real meaning), 60  is the 
paradigm proposed here (in effect) bucking the trend for any good reason? In the same vein, 
what is its effect on how lawyers will argue cases (where one party clearly has much more 
financial contributions), and what is its effect where it is the wife who is the homemaker or who 
contributed less in money towards the acquisition of wealth?61 In the whole scheme of things, 
while this case will probably be treated as an aberration (both in content and conclusion), 
sometimes all it takes is one unresolved precedent to unravel everything or send the wrong 
message (even if the intentions are good).  
On yet another view, can it not be said that a mathematical methodology is, in most 
instances, very likely to prejudice the spouse who earned less income during the marriage, or 
conversely, favour the breadwinner?62 After all, the rationale behind statutorily bestowing a 
broad discretion on the courts to achieve the fairest possible division is to avoid both of these 
types of biases. Only by avoiding these biases are the divorcing spouses held to their 
commitment to pool their different efforts during marriage for their mutual benefit; why then, 
upon divorce, should the message be any different? In the case at hand, considering that the 
husband was clearly less successful than the wife in bringing in income (2 million versus 20 
million) during the course of the marriage, it will seem that any sort of mathematical model will 
only serve to give him, as a matter of preliminary impressions, a proportion far smaller than the 
wife’s. Though the final result appears ameliorated by the factoring in of various non-monetary 
contributions, but as submitted above, these are crucial fields in the equation that are not easily 
determined, and in the circumstances, there may even be the separate problem of a perception or 
suspicion of a judicial “inflation” of the non-monetary contributions of the husband to 
compensate for the lop-sided result (had monetary contributions prevailed).63  
                                                            
59  See the extensive surveys of the jurisprudence done by Professor Leong in Elements of Family Law in 
Singapore, supra note 4 at 533-536, 551-555, and 700-751. 
60  Ibid. at 533, 542, 546, and 666-675. 
61  Fortunately, not only are there cases that clearly frown upon an over-emphasis on financial contributions, there 
are cases that even suggest that the length of the marriage is not necessarily an important factor either: ibid. at 
675 and 688-691. 
62  See ibid. at 675: 
 [T]here should no longer be emphasis on financial contribution over non-financial contribution. The exercise 
of the power is moved by the family law view of how wealth is co-operatively accumulated by both spouses 
exerting different efforts during marriage and, concomitantly, rejects the property law view that only 
financial contribution counts towards acquisition where the issue arises between spouses upon the 
termination of marriage. This relates with the underlying premise that on marriage the spouses have engaged 
in an equal co-operative partnership of different efforts so that who between them discharged which effort 
should neither favour nor prejudice the spouse in entitlement to the surplus wealth that remains at the 
termination of their partnership. 
63  Indeed, it is unconvincing how the Judge could have reasonably considered all of the non-monetary contributions 
over a 12-year marriage in just one paragraph: see AJR v. AJS, supra note 1 at para. 42. 
With the foregoing concerns in mind, it is submitted that although the Judge must have 
perceived greater mathematical precision to be synonymous with fairness, the proposed 
paradigm is not without its problems, both from a technical and social viewpoint. 
